Hat\u0131rlamak gerekirse 2012\u2019deki bor\u00e7 takas\u0131 ile toplam borcun yakla\u015f\u0131k yar\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n silinmesine ve krizin 2009 sonunda ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131ndan sonra yakla\u015f\u0131k be\u015f y\u0131l boyunca takip edilen kemer s\u0131kma politikalar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n Yunan bor\u00e7 oranlar\u0131nda bir azalma ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmedi. Bunun nedeni GSYH\u2019nin s\u00fcrekli azalmas\u0131 ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle Yunan ekonomisindeki k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fclmeydi. Emek maliyetlerindeki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fe kar\u015f\u0131n Yunanistan\u2019a verilen kredi \u00fcretken yat\u0131r\u0131ma de\u011fil borcun \u00e7evrilmesine ve bankalar\u0131n ayakta tutulmas\u0131na yar\u0131yordu. 2015 ba\u015f\u0131nda 323 milyar avroluk toplam\u0131yla Yunan borcu hem b\u00fcy\u00fck bir ba\u015f a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 olu\u015fturuyordu hem de borcun d\u00f6rtte \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnden fazlas\u0131 Avrupa Finansal \u0130stikrar Fonu, IMF ve Avrupa Merkez Bankas\u0131\u2019na oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in herhangi bir bor\u00e7 silme i\u015flemi do\u011frudan \u201cresmi sekt\u00f6r\u201d olarak da adland\u0131r\u0131lan bu kurumlar\u0131n kay\u0131plara u\u011framas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelecekti. \u015eubat ay\u0131ndan bu yana aral\u0131klarla devam eden Syriza-Troyka \u00e7eki\u015fmesinde Syriza giderek zemin kaybetti. Bunda AMB\u2019nin elindeki b\u00fct\u00fcn olanaklar\u0131 Syriza h\u00fck\u00fcmetini y\u0131pratmak i\u00e7in kullanmas\u0131n\u0131n da etkisi bulunuyor. \u015eubat ay\u0131nda AMB Yunan bankalar\u0131n\u0131n teminat olarak Yunan bonolar\u0131n\u0131 kullanmas\u0131na olanak sunan ayr\u0131cal\u0131\u011f\u0131 kald\u0131rd\u0131. Bir Avrupa bor\u00e7 konferans\u0131<\/a> toplamak i\u00e7in yeterli destek edinemeyen Syriza\u2019dan y\u00fckselen \u015fantaj su\u00e7lamalar\u0131n\u0131 reddeden Mario Draghi ve AMB takip eden aylar boyunca Yunan bankalar\u0131na do\u011frudan destek sunmayarak Acil Likidite Destek Program\u0131 ile bunlar\u0131n daha y\u00fcksek faizle\u00a0Yunan Merkez Bankas\u0131\u2019ndan bor\u00e7lanmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flad\u0131<\/a> ve bankalar\u0131n ne kadar bor\u00e7lanabilece\u011fini \u00fcst s\u0131n\u0131rla belirledi. Tsipras\u2019\u0131n deyimiyle boyunlar\u0131ndaki ilme\u011fi tutan AMB<\/a> kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda bor\u00e7 \u00f6demelerini ask\u0131ya alma plan\u0131 olu\u015fturmayan Syriza merkezi giderek kemer s\u0131kma program\u0131na itirazlar\u0131n\u0131 azaltt\u0131, kamu gelirlerinin (\u00f6zelle\u015ftirmeler, vergi d\u00fczenlemeleri vb. yoluyla) artt\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve faiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131 fazla verilmesi konusunda tavizler verebilece\u011fini belirtti. Verilen tavizlerin Avro b\u00f6lgesinde kalmak u\u011fruna Syriza program\u0131n\u0131n (Troyka\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6nerdi\u011fi d\u00fczlemde emek piyasas\u0131 reformu, sosyal kesintiler ve devlet yap\u0131land\u0131rmas\u0131 vb. arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla) tasfiyesine uzand\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 3 Haziran\u2019da ba\u015flayan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler<\/a> \u00f6ncesinde Frans\u0131z Le Monde<\/em> gazetesi \u00fczerinden Avrupa Kamuoyuna \u015fikayette bulunan Tsipras<\/a>\u2019tan \u00f6\u011frenme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalad\u0131k. \u0130ronik olan nokta bu tavizler arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla hedeflenenlere (s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir bor\u00e7 ve b\u00fcy\u00fcme) \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclen faiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7e fazlas\u0131yla ula\u015fman\u0131n dahi pek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmamas\u0131.<\/p>\n Bor\u00e7 s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilirli\u011fi i\u00e7in referans olu\u015fturan temel unsurlar faiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7e fazlas\u0131 (s), b\u00fcy\u00fcme oran\u0131 (y), reel efektif faiz oran\u0131 (r) ve borcun GSYH\u2019ye oran\u0131 (d) (Elbette stok-ak\u0131m uyarlamas\u0131 ve parasal taban\u0131n etkisinden de s\u00f6z edilebilir ama basitle\u015ftirilmi\u015f ve \u00e7ok\u00e7a kullan\u0131lan form\u00fcle bak\u0131l\u0131rsa bu d\u00f6rt oran\u0131n kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemek m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr. Borcun ayn\u0131 oranda kalmas\u0131 i\u00e7in minimum faiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7e\/GSYH oran\u0131 olarak s=[(r-y)\/(1+y)].d). 1<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0[i]<\/a> Buna g\u00f6re y\u00fcksek b\u00fcy\u00fcme oranlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6r\u00fclmedi\u011fi ve bor\u00e7\/GSYH oran\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fcksek oldu\u011fu bir ekonomide \u00e7evrilebilirlik a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan temel g\u00f6sterge faiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7e fazlas\u0131 haline geliyor.<\/p>\n Deflasyonist bir ortamda, ekonomisi kriz sonras\u0131nda ilk defa 2014 son \u00e7eyre\u011finde<\/a> 0,3\u2019l\u00fck b\u00fcy\u00fcme g\u00f6steren Yunanistan i\u00e7in bir egzersiz yap\u0131lacak olursa durumun vehameti anla\u015f\u0131labilir. Bor\u00e7\/GSYH oran\u0131 % 180\u2019e yakla\u015fm\u0131\u015f Yunanistan\u2019\u0131n iyimser bir tahminle % 1 b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc ve beklentiler do\u011frultusunda reel efektif faiz oran\u0131n\u0131n% 4 oldu\u011funu<\/a> d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnelim. Buna g\u00f6re 2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda Yunanistan\u2019\u0131n bor\u00e7\/GSYH oran\u0131n\u0131n yerinde saymas\u0131 i\u00e7in gereken faiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7e fazlas\u0131 oran\u0131 % 5 civar\u0131nda. Bu yaz\u0131 yaz\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u0131rada ilk g\u00fcn\u00fc geride kalan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde Syriza temsilcilerinin oran\u0131n 2015 i\u00e7in % 1 olmas\u0131na u\u011fra\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 belirtiliyordu.<\/p>\n Bu rakamlar\u0131n g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi \u00fczere b\u00fcy\u00fcme oranlar\u0131nda yak\u0131n d\u00f6nemde radikal de\u011fi\u015fiklikler beklenemeyece\u011fi i\u00e7in reformist bir \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f dahi borcun k\u0131smen silinmesinde yat\u0131yor. Ancak bunun da \u00f6tesinde sorunlu olan unsur s\u00fcrekli kemer s\u0131kma gere\u011fini g\u00fcndemde tutan \u201cfazla verme\u201d ve \u201cgeliri artt\u0131rma\u201d s\u00f6ylemiyle \u00e7at\u0131lm\u0131\u015f \u00e7er\u00e7evenin i\u00e7ine Syriza\u2019n\u0131n kendini hapsetmesi. Borcun yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve hatta k\u0131smen silinmesi gibi unsurlar\u0131n siyasi g\u00fcndemden d\u0131\u015far\u0131ya at\u0131lmas\u0131. Bu politik tercihler Tsipras\u2019\u0131n balkon konu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n tam tersine Avro B\u00f6lgesi\u2019nde her \u015feyin eskisi gibi devam edebilece\u011fi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesinin sadece Avrupa Komisyonu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Juncker\u2019de de\u011fil Tsipras ve Varoufakis a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan da g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc korudu\u011funu g\u00f6steriyor.<\/p>\n Yunanistan 2015 i\u00e7inde vadesi dolan 30 milyar avro de\u011ferindeki borcu bir yap\u0131land\u0131rma ya da yeni kredi almadan \u00f6deyebilecek durumda de\u011fil. Mevduat taban\u0131n\u0131 yitirmekte olan bankalar\u0131n AMB\u2019nin dayatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ko\u015fullarda yat\u0131r\u0131m i\u00e7in kredi sunmas\u0131 da olanaks\u0131z. Troyka son derece bilin\u00e7li bir \u015fekilde elindeki cephaneli\u011fi kullanarak Syriza\u2019y\u0131 program\u0131ndan vazge\u00e7me ve teslim olma a\u015famas\u0131na getirmi\u015f durumda. Son g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler devam ederken Varoufakis a\u00e7\u0131klama yapmadan uyuyamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirten Yunan tweeter<\/em> kullan\u0131c\u0131s\u0131na yata\u011fa gitmesini sal\u0131k veren<\/a> bakan\u0131n tavr\u0131 genel olarak Syriza merkezinin tavr\u0131n\u0131 simgeliyor.<\/p>\n Akl\u0131selim davran\u0131rlarsa Troyka ile anla\u015facaklar\u0131n\u0131<\/a> d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnen Syriza merkezine kar\u015f\u0131 parti d\u00fcmeninin Sol Platform taraf\u0131ndan ters istikamete k\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmezse \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki g\u00fcnlerde iki ihtimal g\u00fcndeme gelecek: Anla\u015fma sa\u011flayamayan Syriza yeniden destek toplamak i\u00e7in y\u0131pranm\u0131\u015f merkeziyle erken se\u00e7imi g\u00fcndeme getirecek ya da anla\u015fma sonras\u0131 Troyka\u2019n\u0131n isteklerini yeniden paketleyerek halka sunmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facak. Bankalar\u0131n kamula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve Avro b\u00f6lgesinden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131n k\u00f6\u015fe ta\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturdu\u011fu Troyka\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 bir program\u0131n s\u00fcre\u00e7 i\u00e7inde Syriza\u2019da hakim hale gelmemesi partinin par\u00e7alanmas\u0131n\u0131 da bar\u0131nd\u0131ran b\u00fcy\u00fck bir yenilgiye yol a\u00e7abilir g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n (4 Haziran 2015 tarihinde Kriz Notlar\u0131<\/a><\/em>\u00a0blogunda yay\u0131nlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.)<\/p>\n — Ali R\u0131za G\u00fcngen Syriza iktidara geldikten sonra \u015eubat ay\u0131 sonunda s\u00fcresi dolacak paketle ilgili g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere giri\u015fip d\u00f6rt ayl\u0131k bir uzatma kopard\u0131. Ancak bu giri\u015fim ayn\u0131 zamanda Syriza y\u00f6netiminde daha radikal ad\u0131mlar atmak ve Troyka\u2019ya (Avrupa Merkez Bankas\u0131 \u2013 AMB, Avrupa Komisyonu ve IMF) kar\u015f\u0131 kararl\u0131 bir duru\u015f sergilemek konusundaki \u00e7ekimserli\u011fi de g\u00f6sterdi. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[230],"tags":[226,53,170,174],"class_list":["post-1375","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-13-sayi-22-haziran-2015","tag-ali-riza-gungen","tag-onsayfa","tag-syriza","tag-troyka"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1375","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1375"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1375\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1385,"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1375\/revisions\/1385"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1375"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1375"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1375"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"greekdebt\"](\"https:\/\/pgbsosyalizm.org\/yenicms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/greekdebt.gif\")
<\/a><\/p>\nBile bile lades mi?<\/h2>\n
Son d\u00fczl\u00fck<\/h2>\n
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